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In a recent book review respecting the third volume of the celebrated 
biography of former American President Lyndon Baines Johnson, Master of 
the Senate The Years of Lyndon Johnson, by Pulitzer Prize winner Robert A 
Caro,1 I was afforded an opportunity to consider the insidious nature of racism 
and how the law might be seen as an agent for the elimination of racism and 
of racial discrimination. In the same vein, in my review of Separated: 
Aboriginal Childhood Separations and Guardianship Law, by Dr A D. Buti,2 
I was able to consider, albeit in brief compass, the question of racialized 
thinking in Australian child welfare legislation and jurisprudence together 
with the related concepts as applied in other Western legal systems. I have 
also discussed briefly the question of racism, specifically respecting the 
Holocaust, in my review of From Buchenwald to Carnegie Hall,3 by M Filar 
and C Patterson, and of racial discrimination in reviewing A Right to Read: 
Segregation and Civil Rights in Alabama’s Public Libraries, 1900-1965, by P 
T Graham.4 Finally, I had occasion to advert to the issue of racially biased 
laws in my review of Reflections in Prison: Voices from the South African 
Liberation Movement,5 edited by M Maharaj. Accordingly, I concluded that it 
might be of interest to address this issue in a systematic series of reviews of 
five representative books touching upon a variety of spheres of human activity 
related to law and in which I would analyze how racial bias may translate into 
legal consequences and transform (or prevent the transformation of) the 
existing legal regime. 
 
The publication of late of a number of books having as their main focus the 
question of racism, but each from a different perspective having a profound 
impact on the lives of any individual, that is to say constitutional law, 
medicine, policing, higher education and child welfare proceeding provided a 
signal opportunity to evaluate the evolution of what may be described as 
‘legal’ racism and to advance a number of insights respecting the means of 
eradicating this malignancy from our judicial institutions and, ultimately, 
from society at large. 
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The first of the five books selected for inclusion in this thematic review 
addresses the judicial foundation for racism as it was once practised in the 
antebellum United States of America. Indeed, it is suggested in the strongest 
terms that in order to understand how vestiges of racism continue to influence 
both legal reasoning and our judicial institutions, it is necessary to understand 
fully the pre-eminent status once enjoyed by the ‘peculiar institution’ that was 
the slavery code. In this respect, I can think of no better starting point than the 
recent publication of The Union on Trial: The Political Journals of Judge 
William Barclay Napton 1829-1883, edited by Christopher Phillips and Jason 
L Pendleton. This massive and superbly edited tome lays bare the thoughts of 
a Northern-born but Southern-educated lawyer, who later became a Missouri 
state judge and who came to espouse fully the so-called constitutional, judicial 
and moral defences and foundations of slavery. I have commented elsewhere 
that legal scholars neglect to their peril the wonderful stores of information 
found in diaries in general, and in particular in the diaries of eminent jurists.6 
This text contains a wealth of information and insights respecting the 
philosophy according to which blacks were inferior to whites and could not be 
heard to complain if they were subjugated within a system that denied them 
fundamental freedoms in that the over-arching legal regime would eventually 
elevate them in terms of academic and moral achievements well beyond 
anything they might have achieved otherwise.  As noted at page 108, ‘the 
extension and diffusion of slavery – rather than being shut up in narrow 
limits’ is what is required in order to ‘ameliorate the condition of the slave as 
well as the master.’ Judge Napton was even of the view, as discussed at page 
217 and page 229, that black slaves might be convinced to fight on the side of 
the South in the Civil War. 
 
Time and again, the author’s diary entries, explained and situated within their 
proper historical and legal settings, illustrate how slavery was not only a right, 
it was right and not wrong to pursue its extension, as this would profit both 
the owner and the owned. In this respect, students of advocacy would do well 
to examine closely the many examples of sophistry and of what might be 
called ‘reversing the proposition’ offered by Judge Napton to justify the 
wholesale denial of liberty to an entire population of men, women and  
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children based on the colour of their skin, as justified upon a constitutional 
foundation. By way of limited example, I note at page 54 that the author was 
skilled in the use of debating tricks such as turning a hypothetical yet unlikely 
outcome against his opponents while page 87 offers an apology for the fact 
that lawyers of his time and region ‘who are first rate pleaders … will take 
every advantage honourable or dishonourable as they might be considered 
elsewhere.’ 
 
Further, this text provides fascinating reading for constitutional scholars 
interested not only in the legal foundations for discriminatory or unequal 
treatment of citizens or residents, but also in the evolution of federations.7 
One passage may be cited merely to illustrate the overall merits of this 
element of the various discussions respecting the rights of members to secede. 
As recorded at page 331: ‘The Constitution made no provision for a secession 
of any state, nor for a war on one, if she did secede. A provision is never made 
for the dissolution of governments. Constitutions avail nothing when this 
point is reached and it is therefore immaterial what you call it – resistance, 
secession or revolution.’ 
 
Finally, I wish to say a word about the book’s potential value to scholars of 
restorative justice, at least at the level of societies or communities at the very 
least. A number of passages demonstrate the learned diarist’s interest in 
mechanisms that might be called in aid to restore the unity that once 
characterized a host of social or political entities. As discussed perhaps most 
usefully at page 231 and following, it is often necessary for the stronger of the 
parties, or for the strongest, to refrain from resorting to its complete power or 
from taking full advantage of its prominent situation in order to effect 
reconciliation. This theme is also discussed quite ably in Adenauer’s Germany 
and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, by Norbert Frei 
[Columbia University Press: New York, 2002], especially at pages 235-250. 
 
Having discussed briefly the formal nature of a system of constitutional 
government in which racial inequality could be not only justified and 
defended, but erected upon a constitutional footing, it will be opportune to 
draw attention to a legal system that made no apparent provision for the rights 
of a majority of the inhabitants, as it would be futile to speak of ‘citizens’ in 
the case of the aboriginal men, women and children of Tasmania in the 
nineteenth century. That the original inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land were 
bereft of any rights based on racialized thinking is made manifest when one  
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considers that their bodies were disposed of after death as if they had been no 
more than household objects suitable for ‘recycling’, to resort to a modern 
expression. In this respect, although Human Remains Episodes in Human 
Dissection by Professor Helen MacDonald of the University of Melbourne, 
was meant to provide a scholarly treatise on the abuses and scandals 
associated with the medical profession, it serves the secondary purpose of 
marshaling the facts supporting an unanswerable indictment of racial 
discrimination. 
 
This excellent and original title contains multiple references to medical 
practices wholly inconsistent with any legal regime having the slightest 
respect for fundamental notions of decency and integrity; stated otherwise, the 
practices described herein by disciples of Themis and of Hippocrates could 
hardly be less consonant with the teachings we associate with these two 
outstanding representations of these highly critical branches of human 
endeavour. By way of limited example, we read time and again of 
rationalisations by means of which the bodies of murderers are made available 
to men of science for supposedly rigorous experiments. Page 15 points out 
that England was described as having enlightened laws which provided 
murderers with an opportunity to atone for their crimes by the use and 
exploitation of their bodies after death.  
 
Turning then to the heart of the book, Chapter Four, at pages 96-135, is aptly 
titled ‘The Bone Collectors’ (and it includes a section named ‘Collecting 
Tasmanians’) for it draws valuable light on the racist practices associated with 
obtaining and dissecting the remains of the first inhabitants of Tasmania. The 
author succeeds in demonstrating how reason ceased to operate and the 
depravity and insensitivity of those so-called scientific and educated men as 
they literally fought and connived to steal bodies of those dead and dying, and 
no body was more precious than those of Aboriginals. Professional standing 
and personal wealth were tributary to one’s ability to rob hospital hospices 
and the wholesale crime described herein was made relatively easier as a 
result of the widespread belief that the First Nations were either akin to beasts 
or degenerates or not far removed from that state. 
 
Of greater interest, Professor MacDonald is able to recount how this state of 
affairs was perpetuated for so long by demonstrating the racialized thinking 
that supported the dominant position of the Europeans, as manifested by such 
techniques as measuring the brain box of the Tasmanians. In short, Human 
Remains Episodes in Human Dissection has much to teach us about the 
reinforcing weight of racist medical philosophies on the development and 
evolution of a racist legal system. After all, if bodies ‘have been cut and torn,  
 




hammered and chiseled, snipped and sawn until they are no longer 
recognizable as individuals’ by the colony’s elite, as recorded at page 136, it 
is not surprising that the common European will be left with a belief that the 
Aboriginals are no better than cattle. In other words, if the medical world, and 
by extension the legal world to the limited extent that it oversaw the work of 
physicians at the time, consider natives to be close to animals, then little 
concern need be raised if they are treated as animals.8 
 
The next book to be reviewed was written by Ben Green and bears the 
evocative title Before His Time: The Untold Story of Harry T. Moore, 
America’s First Civil Rights Martyr. The author’s objective was to make 
known the circumstances of the as yet unsolved murder of Mr Moore on 
Christmas night in 1951 (and of his wife who subsequently died of her 
wounds), a murderous act motivated by a desire to eliminate a committed civil 
rights worker whose diligence and organizational skills in registering voters 
and in promoting the objectives of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Coloured People was perceived as threatening by radical 
whites. My interest in discussing this book centres on the author’s treatment 
of the perspective, inactions and misconduct of a number of high ranking 
police officials, including the local sheriff, in the original murder and in the 
subsequent killing of two young blacks accused of rape. The police’s 
involvement in the death of these two young men appears by all objective 
accounts to have been an act of naked aggression, a legal lynching if you 
wish, by which it was sought to make plain who was in control of the life of 
blacks in the South. In this, the author breaks a new path in that many titles 
have considered the injustices visited upon blacks when charged with crimes; 
the ultimate contribution of Before His Time resides in its damning analysis of 
the whitewashing of any illegality visited upon the black minority by the 
white majority. In sum, how the ‘Jim Crow’ system of segregation served not 
just to oppress in general, but to ensure the legal salvation of any accused 
charged with a crime against a black. 
 
In effect, Mr. Green’s highly detailed and well written account of the life and 
times and death of Mr Moore and of his wife, together with the related 
episode surrounding the deaths of the two detainees, provides an official 
accusation, or indictment if you wish, of the quite widespread and popular  
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abuse of police powers in a land and at a time when the denial of equality was 
the spirit infusing the letter of the law. The book contains dozens of examples 
of perverse investigations and trumped-up defences that served to insulate 
whites from any adverse consequences for their violent actions directed at 
blacks or black sympathizers. As we read at page 110, ‘[i]n every way, [Mr 
Moore] was on the cutting edge of change in the South – pushing for political 
enfranchisement and educational equality, and openly confronting lynchings, 
police brutality, and racial injustice as fiercely as any other Africn American 
leader in the South.’ Faced with such a challenge, the men who murdered him 
were no doubt confident that the existing police authorities, imbued with a 
racialized philosophy and biased power structure dependent on the absence of 
any effective black vote, would support their bloody deed and the fact that no 
murderer has ever been arrested appears to support fully this reasoning. 
 
In the final analysis, the lessons to be drawn from this riveting biography of 
Mr Moore, the first martyr to the cause of black freedom in the sense of the 
first victim who was not murdered spontaneously but after careful planning, is 
that a legal system must be judged not by the words that constitute the actual 
legislative regime and not by the existence of a police apparatus apparently 
devoted to justice, but by the actual workings of the system as judged on a 
day-to-day basis from the perspective of the least powerful and most visibly 
powerless. As pointed out in many recent studies in the field of criminology, 
paradoxes and apparent contradictions are often seen as commonplace 
whenever the State seeks to resort to its criminal law power. In other words, 
as made plain in the introductory passage and many of the essays found in 
Hard Lessons Reflections on Governance and Crime Control in Late 
Modernity edited by Richard Hil and Gordon Tait [Ashgate: Burlington, Vt., 
2004], as illustrated at p. 2: ‘[N]or should we be shocked when things “go 
wrong” in the domain of crime control since many unintended consequences 
are, more often than not, quite predictable.’ In this respect, Professor Lucia 
Zedner has remarked: ‘[D]efinitions of crime are historically and politically 
contingent … [scholarship] seeks to reveal the power relationships and 
political imperatives that underlie criminalization.’9  
 
Gateway to Justice: The Juvenile Court and Progressive Child Welfare in a 
Southern City by Professor Jennifer Trost of Saint Leo University is of 
assistance in discussing the establishment and development of a child 
protection system along racial lines in Memphis, Tennessee during the first 
half of the last century. In other words, unlike the legal system in evidence in 
Judge Napton’s times which constitutionalized racial inequality, and the legal  
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system in Mr. Moore’s time which enshrined equality de jure so long as you 
were not black, the system reviewed in Gateway to Justice actually mandated 
racial inequality, openly and unashamedly. As we read at page 48: 
 
The Memphis Juvenile Court reflected contemporary southern race 
relations in its operation and adhered to the principle of public racial 
separation. Memphis municipal code mandated that detention facilities and 
officer duties be segregated by race. … The Court had ‘white’ days and 
‘colored’ days for hearing cases. The ideology of segregation even 
influenced the court’s record keeping: social files were color coded on the 
outside to enable easy identification of the client’s race.  
 
Even though the establishment of a juvenile court in Memphis was part of a 
national movement, child welfare advocates both inside and outside the 
South acknowledged that racial considerations structured its day-to-day 
operations.  
 
Not surprisingly, the author concluded at page 48: ‘[A]lthough black children 
were not excluded from the new system of juvenile justice, they clearly 
received inferior treatment because the court segregated its facilities by race.’ 
Indeed, the need for racial separation (and black adherence to this system) 
was so ingrained that the presiding judge would use ‘the juvenile court to 
enforce deferential behavior of black children toward whites’(page 55).  
 
A review of the entire text leads to the inevitable conclusion that race 
permeated all of the work of the Court and no degree of commendation for the 
positive contributions made by the juvenile authorities, and they were 
numerous, can offset the fundamental fact that black inferiority was the 
hallmark value of this particular system of child welfare and child protection. 
Racism was inherent in the legal system both de jure and de facto and no 
doubt left its mark in an indelible fashion.10 
 
The last area of interest surrounds the question of denial of access to post-
secondary education to qualified black applicants based wholly upon their 
race. In this respect, I found Maurice C Daniels’ biography of Justice Horace 
T Ward, titled Desegregation of the University of Georgia, Civil Rights 
Advocacy, and Jurisprudence, to be illuminating with regard to the extent to 
which lawyers will embrace philosophical perversities and endorse obvious  
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sophistries when motivated by racial imperatives to keep a part of their life 
free from ‘contamination’ by others they find to be inferior, in this case the 
presence of blacks as students in white post-secondary institutions. Indeed, 
what was remarkable in the Ward biography was the offer made by the 
officials of the State of Georgia to fund his post-secondary education, but only 
if he agreed to study ‘up North’. Further, I cannot but proclaim my wonder at 
learning of the reaction of Southern politicians to Court decisions setting aside 
the refusal of offers of admission to black law students: the creation of a 
single student wholly segregated black law school! Refer to page 15. It is not 
surprising therefore that the White regents of the University of Georgia Law 
School were prepared to close down the Faculty lest one single black 
‘contaminate’ the University. 
 
By way of summary, I commend this book for the lessons it contains on 
advocacy. Multiple examples are offered of devastating cross-examinations 
and of equally persuasive trial strategies in the context of mendacious 
witnesses bent on denying that their motivation to deny access to each and 
every black applicant was based on race! In considering the extent to which 
the State lawyers had sought to obstruct the applicant’s access to higher 
education, I am reminded of some of the language found at page 87 of The 
Union on Trial: ‘[F]irst rate pleaders … will take every advantage honourable 
or dishonourable as they might be considered elsewhere.’  
 
In summary, a review of these five books discloses that the history of the law 
respecting the advancement of minority groups has been marked by signal 
failures of vision and of humanity. Further, lawyers have attempted to 
promote racism throughout the period under study. Nevertheless, it seems 
evident that lawyers are the key to the eventual elimination of such obstacles 
to human progress and dignity. In the words of Sir Sydney Kentridge, Q.C., 
‘There may be times, fortunately rare, when one’s own conscience rather than 
the general rule [that counsel must represent those who seek representation 
notwithstanding the nature of their legal claim] must govern one’s conduct.’11 
 
                                                 
11 See ‘The Boswell Question Revisited’ in H P Krever and R P Armstrong (eds) The 
Dubin Lectures on Advocacy 1998-2002 (2004) 70. 
